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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
UNl'l'I£D 8'l'A'I'Ij~8 SMh:l/riNG
HljJFlNING AND 11lN1NO CO::\IPANY,
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vs.
PHAHJ£8 HAYNES, as County
Treasurer of Tooele County,
a legal subdivision of the
8tate of Utah,
Appellant

Case No.

6931

COl\IBINED ME'rALS HEDUC'I'ION
CO:M PANY, a corporation,

Respondent,
Case No.

vs.
TOOELE COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic. of the State of Utah
and PHARES HAYNES as County
Treasurer of 'rooele County
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PETITION FOR REHEARING
Come now United States Smelting Refining and
Mining Company and Combined Metals Reduction Com-

2

pany, the Plaintiffs and Respondents respectively named
in the above-entitled cases and pursuant to Order of
this Court authorizing Petitioners to file a consolidated
Petition therein, petition the Court for a rehearing in
the above entitled cause::o.
Your Petitioners ret:ipectfully repre::oent that the
Court in it::o Opinion, erred in the following particulars:
1. Ln so construing Section 80-6-37 a::o to render
the net procee<ls method of valuation unreasonable, inequitable and violative of the constitutional requirement of uniformity.
2. In disregarding material fact::-; stipulated to between the parties.
;). In disregarding Section 81-1-1, Utah Code Annotated 1D4:3, which defines a sal<~ and thereby nece::osarily
limits the meaning of the phrase ''gross proceeds realilled '" '' * from the ::oale ., * ., to the consideration for
which tl1e tran::ofer of property is made, which consideration is called 'the price.' ''
4.

ln ignoring Section 80-3-1 defining "value" as:
"(5) 'Value' and 'full cash value' mean the
amount at which the property would be taken
in payment of a just debt due from a solvent
debtor."

and thereby reaching a conclusion necessarily implying
that the less vaiuable a property, the greater the amount
at which it would be taken in payment of a just debt from
a solvent debtor.
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WIU~HJ1~FOHJ1J, H(~tipondcnts

pray that this petition
he granted anJ that upon rehearing the decision of this
Court heretofore made and entered be vacated and that
the dcei~ion ol' the trial eourt he affirmed.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING

l1'or convenience and particularly in view of the
time tlmt has elapsed tiincc the original hearing, we
shall make a brief restatement of the relevant fads.
rrllese actions involve the construction to be placed
upon Section 80-5-57, Utah Code Annotated 1943, relative to determining the base for valuation of metalliferous mines for a(l valorem tax purposes. As far as
pertinent here, Section 80-5-5G, U.C.A. UJ43, reads as
follows:
''All metalliferous mines and mining claims,
both placer and rock in place, shall be assessed
$5.00 per acre and in addition thereto at a value
equal to two times the net annual proceeds thereof for the caltmdar year next preceding * ~, *.''
Section 80-5-57 defines the phrase, ''net annual proceeds,'' and provides in part:
"The words 'net annual proceeds' of a metalliferous mine or mining claim arc defined to
be the gross proceeds realized during the preceJing calendar year from the sale or conversion
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into money or it1i equivalent of all ores from
such mine or mining claim extracted by the owner
or le1isee, contractor or other person working
upon or operating the property, including all
dumps and tailings, during or previous to the
year for which the assessment is made, less the
following and no other, deduction: * * * ''
In fixing the valuation of the mines involved for
general tax purpo1Ses for the year 194i3, the defendants
and appellants included in the tax base and as a part
of the '' gro1is proceeds realized during the prec·eding
calendar year from the sale or conversion into money
or its equivalent"-of the ores from 1iuch mines the
subsidy payments received hy the mining companies
from the Federal Government for production of copper,
lead and r,inc in excess of quotas fixed by the War Production Board and the Office of Price Administration.
It is stipulated that these sub1iidies were paid to
encourage additional production and to make pos1iible
the extraction of submarginal ores and to pay the in-

creased costs incident to such extraction.

Jt is stipulated that the subsidies received by respondents were not received at the time of sale or disposal of the ores and metals nor were they received from
the purchaser1; thereof. They were received sometimes
before sale to the purchaser and sometimes subsequently
thereto. They were not a part of or in any manner refleeted in or related to any sale or any consideration for
a sale or conversion into money of the ores or metals.
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The appellants, purporting to act under the statutes
above rel'(_~rred to, added to the sums received by respondents [rom the sale of their ores and metals during
the year HJ..J-:~, the amount of the subsidy payments received hy respondents from the Federal Government
aml levied a tax thereon amounting in each case to the
sum prayed for in the complaint. These amounts are
in no manner disputed in the record.
'J'he trial court found the issues m favor of the
plaintiffs and respondents and rendered judgment acconlingly. This court on appeal, by a divided opinion,
reversed the trial court and held that the subsidy payments received by respondents from the Federal Government were properly includable in the tax base.
lt is with respect to this decision and conclusion
that petitioners pray for a rehearing and point out that
the eourt erred with regard to material stipulated facts
and the application of the controlling statutes thereto.
~We

shall discuss the points raised in the order
in which they are set out in the petition for rehearing.
Heference herein will be made to the record in cause
No. 6~J:n, United States Smelting, Refining and Mining
Company vs. Phares Haynes as County Treasurer of
Tooele County, a legal subdivision of the State of Utah.

ARGUMENT
1. The Court erred in so construing Section 80-5-57
as to include "premium payments" in "net proceeds,"
thereby rendering such section as so construed unreason-
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abl(', ineqnita!Jie and violative of the Constitutional re<{nirement ol' uniformity of taxation.
'l'he Court conedly states in its Opinion m Case
No. G!J:n that:

"The matter involv<~d in this ease is not
Ute priec received from eopper, lead or "'iue; it
is not the quantity ol" ore mined nor the eost of
mining same; it is not the c1uotas fixed by the
government, nor the reasons for such <1uotas.
The oul,t; matter incolrcr/ is the ralualion for
assessliteut }Jitrposes of' the Mine on .JanlW1',1J +,
1!!44."
'l'he Court states m its opmwn t!tat J>n;mium Pa!Jments were,
· · rlesigned lo encourar;c and nwkc possible the
JJt.ininr;, c..rtraction and refinin,r; of suu-uwrrrinal
orcs ?t•hir:h ot/u;rwise u.·ould not be · pa,1; dirt.· ''

'l'o iuelude payments made for such purlJose in gross
proceeds is nceessaril.v to hold that the greater the costs
of produetion the more valuable a mine. No member of
this Honorable Court, notwithstanrhnr; the Opinion of
tl1e Court in these cases, u·ould pay as much for a ·mine
1rltic!t could only produce with the aid iof a b·onus as
he would pay for a 1nine which cmtld operate at a profit
'Without such bonus.
As the Court stated above,
·'the only nwtter involved here is the valu.ation
for assessment purposes of the mine on JanUIU,IJ
-1-, uq4.''
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Tlmt is not priumrily a legal problem but a practical
problf,~!ll whi<~h dou!JtlL~~s an invesilnent banker, a mine
engineer or anyone else familiar with the business of
mining would he better qualil'ied to determine than would
th<' most expert lawy<~r unacquainted -with mine invL~st
menl~; awl valuationR.
'l'he legal problem whidt tltis Court is ealled upon
to detL~nnine is whether the statutes implementing the
Constitutional re<1uirements as to uniformity of asRessment and taxation contemplate that premium payments
sltonld ht~ indn<le<l in nd proceeds for the purpose of
ddenuining the value of a mine and >vhether, in such
event, the stalntes do or do not violate such Constitutional provisions.
'l'he Constitution requires that all tangible property
in the State not exempt,
'' :ohall he taxed in proportion to its value, to be
aseertained as provided hy law;''
and that
'"!'he Legi:olature :ohall provide by law a uniform
and equal rate ol" as~;cssment and taxation on all
tangible property in the State aecording to it:o
value in money and ::;hall prescribe hy law such
regulation::; as Rhall secure a just valuation for
taxation of :ouch property so that every pcr:oon
and coqJOration shall pay a tax in proportion to
the value of his, Iter or its tangihlc property."
Seelion 80-5-57 must be read in the light of the fact
so well exprc~sc<l hy this Court when it said:

8
''the only matter im:ol,ved here is tlw val1uzlion for
assessment purposes of the mine on January 4,
1944.''

When the Legislature enacted that statute it must
be assumed that it intended to lay down a practical
formula for arriving at the value of mines.
'l'he statute provides for the assessment of mines on
the basis of a multiple of net proceeds. That basis has
been n~cognized as a proper basis for the valuation
of mines. The measure of value so specified had, as this
Court stated in Tintic Standard Mining Co. v. Utah
County, ct al. 80 Utah 4~1, 15 P. (2d) 633, attained a
definite and well understood meaning when the 1918
Constitutional Amendment was adopted.
vVhat that "well understood meaning" was,
in doubt.

IS

not

As 1\lr. Justice Wolfe, in his concurring Opinion in
the consolidated case of Combined Metals Reduction Co.
et al. 1:. State Tax Gouuniss£on, 176 J>. (2d) G14, said:

"Undoubtedly the Legislature, at the time of
the passage of the Occupation 'rax Law, did not
envisage a war, consequent price ceilings and
premium prices. It intended to impose a tax
on the privilege of mining ore, and it made the
measure of that tax a smn equal to l% of the
gross amount recnived for or 1% of the
value of tlw metalliferous ore sold. It may and
•probabl.IJ did ltw'e in mind that the mcasune of
fhe rah.tP of the ore 1{·ould be u:lmt was .rcceiped
directly from the smelter in a bona fide salP lJc-
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uwse it enrisaged that as the ttsttal situwtion ·in
!course of trade and did not tl1ink in term,,-;J iof a
consideration from another source.''
Tlte Oeeupation 'l'ax Ad wm; enacted. in 1D37 so it
<"annot bt~ <ptes tioned thai the Legislature, when enacting
tlw N d Proceeds Law long prior thereto, equally did
Hot have iu mind a situation such as that with wllieh we
are now confronted.
Under the meaning of "net proceeds" as und<~r
stood until this Honorable (;ourt spoke in this case and
in the Occupation 'l'ax cases, the measure of the value
of a mine related to its economic production and the same
factors applied to all mines. 'l'here was such uniformity
as is reasonably possible.
'!'hen there was taken into consideration what a
mine produced, what it cost to produce it and what
it realized from the production and on that basis the
taxing authorities, just like a prospective investor or
any one seeking with ordinary common sense to value
a mine, arrived at an estimate of value.
1\ ow for the first time and admittedly by doing
something the Legislature did not contemplate, it is proposed to inject into the statutory formula for the valuation of a mine a factor which is not only not reasonably
ealculated to determine value, but which is directly oppot-Oed to the other factors therein.
'l'o say that a mine may be valued by including a
payment made to encourage the production of ore which
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coul<l not otherwise be econmuically produced is to say
what is obviously opposed to common sense, to assert
something on which no one would knowingly ad in his
own interest.
To take an illustration: Here are two mines. ln the
year 1D4:J they produced the same quantity of ore. One
of them was able to produce that ore ami to sell it at
ceiling prices and mah:e a profii. The other was unable
to do so but on the contrary would not have been able
to produce except that it was paid by Government a
bonus to make possible the production of its sub-marginal
ores. 'l'he total number of dollars received by the first
mine from the sale of its ores just e<1ualled the total
number of dollars received by the second mine from the
sale of its ores plus the premiums or bonus paid it hy
Government.
1f Government was committed forever to continue
such payments it is conceivable that someone might say
that the two mines were of equal value because irrespective of source one returned to its owners as many dollars
m a given year as did the other.

But as the record shows, no such situation existed.
On the contrary, in a war emergency and for a limited
period Government agreed to pay a bonus to encourage
production of ores which could not otherwise be produced.
\Vould any man say that these two mmes were of
the same value 1
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\V c suhmit that no one would mal::c such a statement
and that thi:,; Court in holding that premium payments
W(~re a part of net proceeds was inadvertently led into
the (~rror of in effect holding that the two mines were of
equal valne.

If the statute was to he construed as including premium payment:,;, then obviously it would violate the Constitutional re<1uircment of uniformity since it would resnlt in imposing el]_ual taxes upon properties of uneqtucl
value.
\V c submit that no reason exists for so construing

Seetion 80-5-57 and that in order so to construe such
section this Court is obliged not only to ignore what it
states has for many years been the well recognized meaning of the phrase, "net proceeds," but also to read into
the statute something which obviously and as pointed
out hy .Tustice \Volfe, was not within the contemplation
of the Legislature and something which destroys the
very hasis upon which net proceeds valuation has become
accepted as a reasonable method of arriving at the value
of a rnme.
As the Supreme Court of the United States said in

United States v. Cooper Corporation, et al. 312 U. S. 600,
85 L. ed 1071:
"But it is not our function to engraft on a
statute additions which \Ve think the Legislature
logicaJly might or should have made.''
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Had tho Legi:slature of Utah, when in 1919 it dofined "net proceeds" contemplated that some day Govermuent would pay a bonus to encourage or make possible the production of sub-marginal ore:s, it doubtles:s
would have taken account of :such fact, hut had it done :so
it llJOst eedainly woulJ have proided not that sneh premiums should he incluJed in net proceeds, hut that they
should he oxeludeJ therefrom. \Ve say this with confidence for the reason that tho purpose of tlw Legislature
\vas to provide a practical, rational method for valuing a
mine and this it obviom;ly could not do by including a
factor evidencing a lack of value with factors going to
make value.
This Honorable Court has said that it is its duty in
construing and interpreting legislative acts to give effect
to tl1o intent of tho Legislature and to avoid an interpretation whieh would lead to an impractical, unfair
or unreasonable result. Non:illc v. State Ta:l' Comli!issilonJ !JS Utah 70, m P. (2d) 937.
This Court has likewise stated that it is required to
give words used their ordinary and natural meaning and
that unless tho contrary appears, the terms of legi:slative enactments must be taken in their ordinary and
usual signifieance, as they are generally understood
among mankind. SaU Lake Union Stock Yards v. State
Tnx Commission of Utah,
J,_'uuncrt:oon

P. (2d) 467.

'O.

~)3

Utah 166, 71 P. (2d) 5:)8;

State TaJ; Commission,

~J3

Utah 219, 72

13
Appellants have pointed to nothing in the language
oi' the statute or in the history of mine taxation in Utah
\\ltjc·ll would warrant any departure from the rule so
lnid down by this Court.
Tlte valLw ol.' a mine, like any other property, is
nteasured by its ability to earn a profit. 'l'he higher the
('('~;h; u1' production, the less the ability to earn a profit.
'J'o indude p1 emium payments made to a mine to weet
(':\('Cs::; eo::;t::; of produetion,-to make post5ible the mining
ol' ::;uh-marginal ores-wl1ieh a::; thit; Court has ::;aid,
"otherwi::;e would not be 'pay dirt'.''
a~;

though such payments represented profit::; derived
from operation, it5 simply to ignore the obvious facts and
to a::;sert that tho more it costs to produce ore the greater
tl•e value of the mine.
l'~veu

were it IJOI:it5ible to ignore the fact that premiuuit5 were paid to make pot5sible production and wore
nu pal't of nul proceeds as that term has been uniformly
under::;tood for many, many years, still premiums could
not he included in measuring the value of a mine without
violating the Con::;titutional requirement of uniformity,
-thi::; J'or the rea::;on that, as the record shows, initial
quotas were based upon production in 1941 and premiums
paid under (A) (1uotas determined upon excess production in 1!)4:3 over production in lD41. Consequently two
lllines producing equal (1uantities of ore at identical
eo::;ts in l!J4:~ would, if premium payments were to be
inrlnded, have different values depending not at all upon
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what happened in 1!)43, but upon what had happened
in 1!)41. lt ito no answer to say that uniformity requires
Hwrely that the t-lallle mle be applied to all. As tl1is Honorable Conrt l-itated in its opinion,
"Dut the different formulae which may be
applied to different bnds of property must he
tom:h that they aim an<l tend to Sl~cure for a:,;scssment purposes a valuation fair and equitable in
comparison with and eonnuemmrate with the valuation of other kin<ls of property."
If produetion in a given year, less certain statutory
deduetions, affords a fair measure for valuing a mine in
eomparison with other clatoses of property, then it must
be because experience has demonstrated this to be a faet,
but this contemplates that value be determined by what
happens in a given year and not by what ha(l happened in
some other year. When it is attempted to include as a
factor an event in past history, then equality is lost. vV e
submit thi8 is too obvious to exeuse further comment.

2. The Court erred in disregarding material faets
stipulated to between the parties.
The Court in its opinion said:
"vVe conclude that 'the gross proceeds realized' as used in this seetion of the statute (Section 80-5-57) means the total or whole amount in
money or other things of value that has been
received or which the owner may receive or take
possession of at his plea8ure or to which he is
entitled on demand and which accrues to him from
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tliP salP or convcrsi,on i:nto money or its crjuivalenl
of ores extracted from the mine or mining
claim;,;."
\\' l' do not ];now why the Court referred in the alternatin• to sale or eonversion into money or its equivalent,
sinee the Court in its opinion, and speaking of the prelllllllll payments, says:

''Are they moneys received from a sale of
ores or metals 'I These orcs or metals belonged,
aurl as far as the record shows still belong to the
m'iner.''
Certainly the Court does not propose to go beyond
the record and as the Court says, the record doe;,; not
show any ::;ale. Ho far as the opinion contains any explanation of this, it appears to lie in the statement not
supported hy the record that,
''Hut if the fact be that these ores or metals extracted therefrom were or have been sold, then
under our <leeision in Combined Metals v. Tax
Commission, No. G8G!), just decided '" * * these
payments would constitute part of the proceeds
received from a sale and properly be a part of the
gross proceeds realized.''
Following this the Court said:
"It follows that whether the metals have been
sold or retained by the miner, the premium payments are part of the gross proceeds realized from
ores extracted from the mine and are to be included in computing the tax base or valuation of
the mine for tax purposes.''

16
T'lH~

Court fudlwr

~ay~:

"Preminm payments apply only to ores
ship1Jed :o the smelter or rc<lnction works. They
arc wade on the basis of the determined metal
eontent of the preeipitates an<l eoneentrates delivcrcd to the smelting company.''
and then in eontradietion to this the Court says:
"ln other words, the premium payments an~ made
only on and when the orcs extracted from the
mine are converted into eoneentrates or bullion
~where the quantity of the various metah; is readily
determinable and the value thereof easily computable. vVhen the extracted ores have been converted or refined into metals in such form that
they have a ready market at definite or readily
dettmninable prices so that at any time the miner
can dispose of them and receive the money therefor, they have been converted into the equivalent
of money, and arc to be included in the computation of gross proceeds for the purpose of fixing
valuation or tax base.''
and again:
''There can be no question but that these premium payments accrue to the miner from the
converting, or rendering, into a marketable eonrlition (the equivalent of money) of ores extracted
from the mine.''
These statements contradict the following stipulated
facts:
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It wm; stipulated that the affidavit set out at R. p.
4H, is a eopy of that submitted by Petitioner, United
Ntat(~S NHJelting Hefining and .Mining Company, as a
ha~is for payments to it. That :,;tatement :,;how:,; that the
quantity ol' copper, lead and zinc daimed as a basis for
}H'Pllli tllll payments represented ''mine pr:oduction faT
11/0ntli s/a1ied as shown by mtT books and TecoTds."
1t was stipulated that:

· · PTemiu,m payments aTe Teceived by United
f:Jtntes Smelting Refining and Mining Company
on the basis of monthly affidavits showing the
production ·acoording •to the company's records
from :~0 to !)() days before the recoverable m.et.(Lls
are available for sale." ( R p. 51)

In order to hold that premium payments were received on a sale, it was nece:,;:,;ary for the Court to find
eitller (in disregard of the record as the court states
it to he) that there had been a sale, or to find in disregard of the above :,;tipulated facts, that the ores had
been conerted m· refined into metals in such form that
tltP_\' have a ready market at definite or readily detenninahle IJrices. Salt Lake County 1i. Utah Copper
('oiii]Hmy, !);l !:<'. (2d) 127.
( )hviously payments made 30 to 90 days before the
J'('('OverahlP metals arc available for sale, payments based
on mine• produetion records, were neither payments made
on a sal(•, nor payments made when the orcs had be(m
convPrt(•d o1· refim~d into metals in such form tlmt the;c
liavt• a l'Pad~c market at definite or readily dctenninable
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pri<·(~:i so ihat at any time tiH~ miner can dispose of them
and n:~eein~ the money therefor. rl'hey are not payments
Ewde when the ores have been "converted into tht• equivah~nt ol' nwnc~·. ·.·

In the Salt Lake County v. Utah Copper Company
vase uhove refene<l lo, it v;m; not sought to indude in m~t
p•·oePc>(h; <·oneentrates ot untreated ores, but solely to
inelude blister copper with respect to whiel1 the courh;
said:
''Blister copper hm; an established and rea<lil.•; ascertainable market value all<l when the taxing authorities were apprised of the muuber of
pounds produced it was a simple matter to appraise its value in money."
'l'l1e record here shows that Utah Copper Company
(now Kennecott Copper Corporation) is paid premiums
not when its ores have been refined into blister copper
hul on the basis of the determined metal content of the
precipitates all<l concentrates delivered to American
f-lnwlting and Hefining Company and that the metals
recovered from such precipitates and concentrates ordinarily h~~eome available for marketing approximately
three months after their delivery to the smelter. R p. GO.
United States Smelting Refining and Mining Company processes most of the ores produced at its own
properties at its mill and smelter at Midvale, Utah and
the resulting products arc shipped out of the state for
further processing to refined metal. R. p. 51.

19
Y l't tile

pn~tmum

paylllents are made to United
~tatl':-' ~-lltldting l\eJ'ininf!; awl l\lining Company on the
lmtii~ of its wine prociudion records l'or a stated ltlOllth
nJJd l'nJill ;;o to !JO days befon~ the recoverable metals an;
m <: i b !Jle l"or sall~.
ul(~

facts\\'(~

snbltlit it is
lJt'yon.i qw•stiml that th<; Court ened in holding that the
Jll'l'lllilllll jJayEwntt> acenw to Uw winer frulll the eonn~l"tin~~· int,J a marketable eondition (the e<1uivalcmt of
wom'!) oL ores extracted from tile wine.
ln

l'aee ol' these stijmlated

The l'ads as stipulated and shown by the reeord
wen• <'<J!Tedly stated by the Court when it said:

"'I' hey (premium payments) were paid to the
produc:el' !Jy the llletalt-; nesel Vl~ Cowpany month1:· ~tpon c~edil'ieatc~t'l l'rmn the~ suwl tc•r showing the
qmllltity ,,( tlw various metal~: o\·<~r the assigrwd
quota dc·liYered to illP ~mc•lter i row the mine."
'!'he~

Court lil,cwise eorredly stated the facts as
stipulat<~d in the rceonl when it said:
"11'inding it necessary or advisable to increase
the producti.an of eertain strategic metals withmtl disturbi,ng the price slructure the Government set up the Metals lleserve Company to carry
out a plan jointly arranged by the War Production Board and the Office of Price Administration des(IJned to increase the output of such
metals.''

\V e submit that the Court clearly erred in holding
Pitlwr that there was a salt~ hy Petitioner, United ~tatet'
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Nmelting l{efining and 1lining Company, or that pn~
mium:s were prid to that Company when on~::> produee(l
hy it had heen converted into the equivalent of money.
:\. The Court erred in di:-;regarding Sedion tll-l-1,
Utah Code Annotate(! l!J4:j, which define::> a ;,;ale and
thereby nece;,;sarily limit:-; the meaning of the phrm;e,
''the amount of money or its e(tuivalent adually
rem~ive(l by the owner * * * from the sale of all
orcs or metals during the calendar year ~, '~ *,''
as contained in Section 80-3-G6, Utah Code Annotated,
194i}.
\Vith re;,;poct to companies such as Petitioner, Combined Metals Heduction Company, which sold its orc:s,
the above section is, we submit, controlling. Moreover, as
discussed in Petition for Rehearing filed by these Petitioners with others in the Occupation rrax eat-ie;,;, (Combined Metals Reduction Company and others v. State
Tax Commission, No. 68ml to G87~l inclusive) the record
shows that premium payments were received by some
companies from 30 to 90 days before the recoverable
metals wore available for sale and in other cases 30 days
or more after the ores had been sold, and com;equently
that not all premium payments could be related to ores
produced in the year in which such premium payments
were received. This in itself would negative the possibility of including such premium payments in computing
net proceeds.
4. The Court erred in it,rnoring Section 80-3-1, defining "value."
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'l'his seetion defines "value" as:
"'\'alue' aml 'full cash value' mean the amount
at which the property would be taken in payment
of a just debt due from a solvent debtor."
N <nvhere iu its opinion does the Court refer to this
statute, whid1 iK of first importance in a case in which,
as thiK Honorable Court has said,
''The only matter involved is the valuation for
assessment purposes of the mine on January 4,
1944.''
We respectfully submit that had the Court considered this statute it could not have held as it did that
the value of a mine coul,d be arrive(l at hy including
something paid to make possible the production of ores
which would not otherwise have been "pay dirt."
H could not seriously be urged that property would
be taken in payment of a just debt from a solvent debtor
at a value arrived at by including moneys paid by government for a short time in a war emergency to secure the
production of critically needed metals and which otherwise could not have been profitably produced.
5. 'l'he Court erred in disregarding the stipulated
statement by Metals Heserve Company that,
"Premium payments made by .Metals Reserve Company are not payments made by that
cornpany or received by the Mining Company for
tlte sale or conversion into rnoney or its equivalent of any ores #.• ·~ " ' . "
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"'l'o the cxtc~n t that any portion o [ such premiums are taken by n state on ae<·ount of a TJI'Operty tax the purpos(' of l\letals Heserve ComIlany in I)aying· the saHie \Yould be del'Pated ,-:- _. . :1:~ ' '
<

G.

The Court erred in failing to construe the tax-

jng statulcs strictly against the defendant and

ap])(~llant

in each of the cases if doubt existed as to the intention
of the Legi8lature.
'l'his has been commented upon in Petition filed hy
P<~titionen;

here with others in the Occupation '!'ax cases.

vVe submit there can be no <1uestion m; to the rule and
further that even were the rule other than it is and were
laxing 8tatute8 ordinarily as between the taxing body
and the taxpayer to he construed in favor of the taxing
body, they would never he so construed when there was
a conflict in intere8t between the taxing body (Tooele
County) and the United States of America.
ln holding that premiums should he included in the
tax base, the Court ignores the fact noted above from
the statement approved by Metals Heserve Company,
the ageney speaking for the United States, that,
"To the extent that any portion of such premiums are taken by a state on account of a property tax, the purpose of Metals Reserve Company in paying the same would he defeated."
IN CONCLUSION it is respectfully submitted that
the Court in its Opinion clearly erred because:
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1.

Premium payments made by government to en-

courage and make post-1ible the production of sub-marginal ore::; whieh otherwise would not be "pay dirt" could
not properly he induded as part of net proceeds for the
purpose of valuing a mine.
2.

The inclusion of sueh prermums would clearly

violate the Constitutional requirement as to uniformity
of assessment and taxation.

:-L

'l'he inclusion of sueh premiums was not within

the contemplation of the Legislature when it enacted
the net proceeds method of mine valuation.
4.

ln Case No.

6~)i31

the Court having determined

as a l"act that there was no sale shown by the record and
the partiet-1 having stipulated that premiums were paid
on the basis of mine production records and from :30 to
!)()

dayt-1 before the recoverable metalt-1 are available for

::;ale, the Court could not find either that premiums were
paid U}Jon a sale or were paid when the ores had been
converted into the equivalent of money.
5.

The Court may not disregard Section 81-1-1,

Utah Code Annotated H)4i).
G.

'!'he Court may not disregard Section 80-3-1,

Utah Code Annotated 1943.
7.

'I' he Court erred in failing to construe the tax-

ing t-1tatutes strictly against the defendant and appellant

in eaeh of tile pret-icnt ca!-iml if doubt existed as to the intention of the Legislature.
Hespectfully submitted,
Hl'~ItBI<}Hrl'

YAN DA11,

Attorney for Hespondent,
Combined l\1 etals Heduction Company

CHENJ;}Y, .Jl<}NS.h}N, MARR &

~WILKINS

Attorneys for Respondent,
United ~Hates Smelting Refining
and Mining Company.
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that in our opinion there is good reason to believe that
the judgments herein objeded to are erroneous and that
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